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Summary 
Low energy efficiency (i.e. defined as energy consumption per GDP) is a significant 
problem for the Belarusian economy. It indicates towards significant, so far unused 
potentials for cost reduction through reduced energy consumption. At times when the 
country seeks to reduce its dependency on energy deliveries from Russia this needs to 
be improved urgently. Consequently, the “Belarusian State Energy Program” intends 
to reduce the current level of primary energy consumption by about 25%. The pro-
gram also mentions priority areas like district heating and distribution systems as well 
as appropriate measures such as stimulating incentives to save energy or increasing 
finance for energy-saving investments. However, our discussion of the present situa-
tion demonstrates that incentives for consumers to save energy are still insufficient. 
Despite the recent, significant price increases, especially consumer prices still fail to 
fully cover the corresponding costs and hence, fail to motivate energy-saving activities 
and behavior. Moreover, low prices also cause low operational efficiency of energy 
companies, which further aggravates the problem. Against this background, we argue 
that improving the situation requires a comprehensive reform of the energy sector, 
which includes the corporatization of energy companies, introduction of independ-
ent regulation, a sufficient tariff reform and – where possible – stimulation of 
competition through liberalization. However, reform progress along those lines has 
so far been very slow. 
We then focus in more detail on three specific areas which all can contribute signifi-
cantly to the goal of higher energy efficiency. However, in looking how to best use this 
potential we find that it can always best be used if supported by market-oriented re-
forms as described above: 
• Cogeneration of heat and power is more energy efficient than separate produc-
tion of both. We argue that the potential for Cogeneration in Belarus is significant. 
Given the relatively low cost of heat from cogeneration, this potential could best be 
used by stimulating wholesale competition for heat and obliging utilities to dispatch 
heat based on least costs. 
• Emissions trade is an important area, which could develop to a significant source 
of finance for projects that increase energy efficiency. However, we argue that at-
tracting green investments requires demonstrating economic viability of those pro-
jects, which also calls for a general reform of the energy sector along the lines dis-
cussed above. 
• Private Sector Participation is not only a promising instrument to receive addi-
tional finance, it also has the potential to increase energy efficiency if private part-
ners have an incentive to generate additional revenue due to lower energy costs. 
However, they all can unfold this potential only if they are allowed to operate in a 
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1. Introduction 
Despite significant improvements in recent years, energy consumption in Belarus is 
still rather inefficient. According to the “Belarusian State Energy Program” the level of 
energy input relative to GDP is still 2-3 times higher than in developed western 
economies. Accordingly, this situation is not efficient as there remain unused poten-
tials for cost reduction through lower energy consumption. Such higher-than-
necessary energy consumption is particularly problematic in a time where the country 
attempts to reduce its dependency on energy deliveries from Russia. 
The reasons underlying the inefficient use of energy in transition economies in general 
have been widely discussed already (see e.g. EBRD Transition Report 2001). Prices 
below cost levels together with various types of cross subsidization and low collection 
rates fail to give incentives for an economic use of energy. At the same time, unprof-
itable operation of power and heat supply has resulted in a significant lack of invest-
ments. As a result, there is also no innovation and infrastructure depletes since even 
necessary maintenance can hardly be financed. Together with increasing overcapaci-
ties, which emerged from the economic decline in the 1990s, this causes low opera-
tional efficiency in generation of heat and electricity, as well as relatively high losses 
in transmission systems. 
Belarusian policy makers have increasingly concentrated on the issue of low energy 
efficiency. The current “Belarusian State Energy Program” envisages a reduction of 
primary energy consumption in 2010 by around 25% of the present level.1 To achieve 
this goal, the program names relevant priority areas such as district heating, distribu-
tion systems and use of local fuels together with the following intentions: 
• Stimulate incentives to increase energy efficiency; 
• Increase finance for energy-saving investment projects; 
• Use other measures such as training, expert appraisal, energy inspections, certifi-
cates for energy intensity, installation of meters for individual consumption etc. 
 
From the perspective of economic policy making the first two points are of the highest 
importance. If economic incentives are set consistently with environmental objectives 
and energy safety concerns, higher levels of energy efficiency can be realized without 
that a centrally-planned bureaucracy with all its pitfalls will be required. More impor-
tantly, it also ensures that the reduction of energy consumption is realized at the low-
est economic costs and it guarantees that investments are sustainable because they 
are based on a solid economic fundament. In this paper we first discuss the problem 
of low energy efficiency and the extent, to which this is caused by insufficient incen-
tives for energy saving. We then describe a strategy necessary for setting the right 
incentives. We also focus on specific areas such as cogeneration of heat and power, 
emissions trade and Private Sector Participation that – if utilized in the right way – 
have high potential to improve energy efficiency. Finally we sum up the discussion and 
conclude. 
2. Improving Incentives for Efficient Energy Use 
2.1 How big is the Problem? 
Indicators of energy efficiency for different countries are given in table 1. The first 
column gives the amount of oil equivalent (in kg) necessary to produce one dollar of 
GDP (in real 1995 prices). Apparently, energy consumption in Belarus is rather exces-
sive, as it requires more than 10 times more energy input (1.59kg of oil equivalent) 
than in Germany (0.13kg) and about five times more than in the USA (0.25kg) to 
                                      
1 More precisely, it is foreseen to reduce total consumption of fuel and energy resources from 2006 to 2010 by 900 
thousand tons of conventional fuel. 
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produce the same output. Considering that cross-country comparisons of GDP are 
more appropriate on a Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis, the efficiency difference is 
much smaller but still significant. In particular, the figures in the second column con-
firm the statement of the “Belarusian State Energy Program” that Belarus’s economy 
operates about 2-3 times less efficient than OECD countries do on average. Accord-
ingly, a 25% reduction of the total primary energy supply relative to GPD, as envis-
aged in the program, would reduce the Belarusian figure to 0.38kg.2 This appears to 
be a realistic goal3 of significant political importance, also from the perspective of en-
ergy security. 
 
Table 1. Energy Efficiency of Selected Countries  
 
 TPES*/GDP** TPES/GDP (PPP) 
Belarus 1.59 0.51 
Russia 1.32 0.59 
   
Germany 0.13 0.18 
OECD (average) 0.19 0.21 
USA 0.25 0.25 
*Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in kg of oil equivalent 
**Gross Domestic Product in 1995 USD 
Source: IEA: Key World Energy Statistics. Paris, 2004. 
 
By how much do energy prices in Belarus give wrong incentives to consumers as they 
fail to cover their costs? In February 2005, electricity prices for industrial consumers 
were set to 6.7 US cent per kWh, which appears to be just high enough to cover the 
relevant costs.4 For households, electricity tariffs are supposed to be set to 4 US cent 
per kWh by the end of 2005. Although this marks a strong increase as compared to 
recent years, it is still less than half of a reasonable estimate for the respective supply 
costs (8USc/kWh).5  
For heat, the average tariff for households in 2004 was about USD 13.4 per Gcal, 
which marks a dramatic increase compared to 2001 where average tariffs accounted 
for USD 2.8 per Gcal.6 But, despite such improvements, average household tariffs still 
cover only about 52% of the officially reported costs (USD 26 per Gcal) and even less 
than 40% of the costs benchmarks estimated by international experts (USD 35 per 
Gcal).7 Since households consume almost 60% of the totally generated heat energy 
(directly and through how water)8 such low average tariff levels indicates that district 
heating as a whole operates not on cost-covering price levels.9 
For gas, the cancellation of privileged gas supplies from Russia in early 2004 has sub-
stantially increased domestic prices. In early 2004, gas prices were set at about USD 
67 per tcm for industries and USD 57 for households (up from USD 58.8 and USD 9.2 
                                      
2 = 0.51*(1-0.25). To some degree, a higher energy intensity in Belarus as compared to other OECD countries can be 
justified by different weather conditions. 
3 For comparison, the EU has expressed its intentions to save at least 20% of its present energy consumption in a 
cost-effective manner (EU (2005), Doing more with Less. Green Paper on energy efficiency). 
4 The variable costs of power supply to industry plus investment costs in the USA and Europe account for about 8-9 US 
cents. In Belarus, the cost of fuel (mainly gas) is still relatively cheap (even after the recent price increases). On the 
other hand, the Belarusian power sector suffers from substantial under-investment and accumulated arrears, which is 
not the case in the US or Western Europe. Hence, our judgement. 
5 According to the EBRD Transition Report 2001, 8 US cent per kWh is a reasonable benchmark for variable costs of 
electricity supply to households plus investment costs. Considering that 11% of all consumers hold privileged status 
(half the price), the average price that all households eventually pay goes even down to 3.8 US cent 
(=4*0.89+2*0.11).  
6 Rakova, E. (2004). Analysis of Energy Tariffs in Belarus. Study prepared for the Committee on Energy Efficiency for 
the social Infrastructure Retrofitting Project. 
7 See e.g. EBRD Transition Report (2001). 
8 Rakova, E. (2004). 
9 In more detail, the biggest part of uncovered costs is born to utility providers operated by the Ministry of Housing 
and Utilities, which directly supply to consumers. In contrast, wholesale tariffs have been increased at higher rates so 
that the tariffs of central heat supplies from “Belenergo” cover their official costs by almost 100%. 
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in 2000). Although average gas prices are now said to fully cover their costs,10 house-
hold tariffs below the level of industry tariffs indicate a significant degree of cross-
subsidization.11 
To conclude, while industry prices of gas, electricity and heat have been raised to-
wards their respective cost benchmarks, household prices are still set at far too low 
levels. Hence, especially household consumers do so far not have sufficient incentives 
to reduce their energy consumption levels. The effect of this lack of incentives is e.g. 
visible in residential buildings that mostly lack sufficient insulation. 
In contrast to price-cost comparisons, judging on the extent of operational efficiency 
is more difficult since less information is available. However, some general conclusions 
can still be derived. Heating systems, for example, typically operate with Soviet-
style technology under a constant flow regime, which makes it difficult to dispatch 
heat from different sources (e.g. based on different costs) and often leads to uneven 
heat distribution. Other causes for low energy efficiency in heating systems in transi-
tion countries are high losses in distribution pipes (in particular in the secondary net-
works between substations and the buildings they serve) and the common vertical ar-
rangement of radiators within a building, because of which it is often not possible to 
control heat at the apartment level.12 As a result of such inefficient design features, 
district heating systems in CIS countries operate much less energy efficient than 
those installed in e.g. Western Europe. For example, the Word Bank estimates state 
that heating one cubic meter of space in a Soviet-style district heating system re-
quires an energy input of 70-90kWh as compared to 45-50kWh with a western-type 
system.13 According to the same source, losses in production (15-40% of fuel energy) 
as well as in distribution (15-25% of heat supply) in Soviet-style systems are about 
three times as high as modern in Western systems.14 With Heat production accounting 
for more than 30% of total primary energy consumption, the potential contribution of 
district heating for improving the economy-wide level of energy efficiency could be 
significant. 
In the power sector, energy efficiency of existing coal or gas-fired generation tech-
nologies is rather low. Table 2 shows that even with modern standard technologies 
energy efficiency is only at about 50%, which means that half of the used energy is 
lost in the generation process. In Belarus, where the predominantly gas-fired electric-
ity generation plants based on old Soviet-style technology most likely operate at even 
lower levels, operational efficiency is probably at around 40%. Similarly, also Cogene-
ration plants in Belarus operate with outdated technology. According to the World 
Bank estimates, efficiency of such plants is around 70-75%, as compared to 80-90% 
in Western Europe. Thus, modernization of the Belarusian electricity sector could po-
tentially increase efficiency of gas-fired power generation and cogeneration plants – 
and thus, reduce primary energy consumption by electricity-generating plants – by at 
least 15%. Moreover, losses in the power grid account for about 10% of consumption, 
which could potentially be also reduced to the Western European standard of around 
                                      
10 Given the intransparent gas-purchasing agreements, establishing a meaningful benchmark for supply costs of gas is 
rather difficult, but the claim of cost coverage on average appears to be realistic, as far as variable costs (excluding 
investments) are concerned. 
11 Supplying gas to large industrial consumers is clearly less costly than supplying it in low quantities to a large num-
ber of private households. 
12 A detailed discussion of inefficient design features of district heating systems in transition economies can be found at 
Meyer, A. and W. Mostert (2000), Increasing the Efficiency of Heating Systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Former Soviet Union, ESMAP Report No. 234, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
13 Meyer and Mostert (2000). 
14 For Western European systems, losses in production account for 5-15% and losses in distribution for 5-10%. 
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5%. In other words, modernization of the electricity sector can clearly be another sig-
nificant element for raising energy efficiency in Belarus.15 
Table 2. Efficiency of Power Generation Technology: Status and Outlook 
Coal  Gas   
Steam Cycle IGCC*  Steam Cycle CCGT** 
      
Technical Standard 1985 38% 40%  42% 48% 
      
Technical Standard 2000 47% 49%  49% 58% 
      
Technical Standard 2010 50% 55%  52% 60% 
*Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle. 
**Combined Cycle Gas Turbine. 
Source: Theis, K.A. and G. Jäger (2001). Increase of Power Plant Efficiency. Paper presented at World Energy Council 
18th Congress, Buenos Aires. 
To conclude this assessment, we consider the Belarusian intention to reduce primary 
energy consumption by 25% realistic. However, such ambitious intentions can hardly 
be realized on the basis of small-scale and local-community oriented projects alone. 
Instead, especially district heating and the power sector, two main consumers of pri-
mary energy that both operate on fairly low levels of energy efficiency, will have to be 
modernized. Hence, investments of USD 2.6 bn (slightly above 10% of the Belarusian 
GDP) over a period of five years as foreseen in the “Belarusian State Energy Program” 
will certainly be necessary. Financing such huge investments (which will account for 
more than 10% of annual gross investments) requires sound economic calculations 
based on a sufficient institutional and regulatory environment. However, as the above 
discussion of tariff and cost levels shows, this is difficult at present. In the following 
we will discuss the general principles of economic and institutional reform necessary 
to ensure profitable operations in the energy sector and to stimulate incentives to in-
crease energy efficiency, as stated in the “Belarusian State Energy Program”. 
2.2. Aggregate supply 
Reform agendas for the energy sector have been widely discussed and recommended 
in the literature.16 In short, such reforms should consist of the following elements: 
• Corporatization; 
• Regulation; 
• Tariff reform; 
• Liberalization. 
 
Corporatization is needed to unbundle the current energy complex into separate in-
dependent firms. This is necessary to take control away from government and enable 
firms to make their own, profit-oriented decisions. Regulation means to move key 
powers such as price and cost control, licensing etc. away from direct government in-
terference to a public but independent authority. Necessary elements of independency 
are a clearly defined legal status, financial autonomy, fixed term of office, pre-
specified appointment criteria, and sufficient resources. Tariff reform must achieve 
that variable costs of production plus investment costs should be covered by con-
sumer tariffs, while at the same time no firm can exploit its market power. Tariff set-
ting and price/cost control must be the main task of the regulator. Ideally, tariffs are 
set in a way to stimulate cost-covering investments such as energy-saving technolo-
                                      
15 Heat and power generation are linked through cogeneration to a significant degree, so that potential energy savings 
cannot be simply added up. 
16 A general guideline for such reforms is e.g. given in the EBRD Transition Report 2001. For Belarus, several papers of 
GET and IPM have already discussed reform agendas for different energy sectors, such as PP/03/05 (Reforms in the 
Belarusian electricity sector: how to reduce costs and dependence on imported resources), PP/15/04 (The state, prob-
lems and directions of gas sector restructuring in Belarus) or PP/03/04 (Belarus as a Gas Transit Country). 
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gies.17 Finally, Liberalization opens up certain market segments to competition, e.g. 
through ensuring non-discriminating Third Party Access (TPA) to energy networks. 
This further stimulates efficiency and cost reductions, improves economic performance 
of enterprises (and thereby also profitability of energy-saving investments) through 
e.g. improved payment collection, creates better finance opportunities etc. 
Despite significant price increases during recent years, the reform progress in Belarus 
along the lines described above has been very slow. In particular, the most important 
firms in the energy sector such as Belenergo, Beltopgaz or all Oblenergos remain still 
non-corporatized. As a result, none of them has the possibility for independent, profit-
oriented decision making. Moreover, tariff regulation is in the responsibility of several 
Ministries and thus under direct control of the government. Finally, there have so far 
been no serious commitments towards liberalizing energy markets and stimulating 
competition. 
3. Key areas for improvement 
In addition to the general reform agenda, several areas deserve special attention with 
regard to potential contributions to higher energy efficiency. Three important parts are 
discussed in this section. 
3.1 Cogeneration of Heat and Electricity 
The joint generation of district heating and electricity in Combined Heat and Power 
plants (CHPs) is significantly more energy efficient than separate generation. As the 
Sankey diagram in figure 1 shows, combined production of 100 units of heat and 55 
units of electricity requires 176 units of fuel inputs (88% energy efficiency) while the 
separate production of the same output requires together 256 units of energy input 
(with 40% efficiency for power and 83% for heat).  
Despite their higher levels of energy efficiency, conditions under which CHPs operate 
and compete with other plants – especially with respect to allocation of variable costs 
– need to be specified in a way that avoids possible distortions. In principle, three 
ways for cost allocation are possible: 
• Energy method: allocation of variable costs in relation to energy output (roughly 
2/3rd to heat, 1/3rd to electricity).  
• Alternative heat (power) production: costs for heat (power) are determined by 
alternative costs of separate heat (power) production. 
• Benefit distribution method: allocation of variable costs in relation to energy in-
put that would be necessary for separate production of heat and electricity 
(about 1 to 1.1 (120 to 136) in figure 1). 
                                      
17 The simplest way to do this is by setting maximum tariffs (Price Caps), so that producers can increase their profits 
by reducing costs. For more on tariff regulation of utilities see e.g. EBRD Transition Report 2004 or Coelli, T., A. Es-
tache, S. Perlelman and L. Trujillo (2003). A Primer on Efficiency Measurement for Utilities and Transport Regulators. 
World Bank Institute, Washington, D.C. 
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Figure 1. Energy Balance of Separate and Cogeneration of Power and Heat 
(for Solid Fuels) 
Source: Meyer and Mostert (2000), appendix C. 
 
The Energy method is typically used in transition economies. However, it tends to dis-
criminate against heat, which typically accounts for larger shares in output. Accord-
ingly, a more appropriate cost allocation is to allocate the benefit of cogeneration as 
described in the Benefit distribution method.  
In addition to price and cost regulation, many governments use additional policy in-
struments to support the use of cogeneration. The simplest way is by providing state 
aid, grants, bonus payments etc. However, this can be expensive and easily creates 
more distortions than benefits. A more appropriate instrument is providing tax incen-
tives. These, however, should be justified on socially accepted grounds (e.g. environ-
mental concerns) and granted to all energy saving technologies in a fair and transpar-
ent way linked to performance goals rather than to specific technologies. Feed-in-
tariffs such as the German Cogeneration Act of 2002, which guarantees unlimited ac-
cess to the power grid at a rather high minimum price, are another possibility. How-
ever, they distort competition and create additional costs that are typically transferred 
to consumers. Another instrument is to issue Least-cost purchase requirements that 
oblige district heating companies to first purchase the least-cost heat. Provided the 
cost allocation rules do not discriminate against heat this benefits cogeneration. It is 
also easy to be implemented, non-distorting and thus, in line with the efficiency goal 
(again, provided that cost allocation is set accordingly, e.g. by the Benefit Distribution 
Method). However, such Least-cost requirements require that heating providers are 
technically able to dispatch based on costs, which is not always possible under the 
standard constant flow regime.  
Belarus has a significant potential for generation of power and heat in CHPs, since 
there exist markets for both, power and heat. Consequently, cogeneration accounts 
already for 50% in power and 40% in heat generation and the “Belarusian State En-
ergy Program” envisages renewal and additional investments. To support these in-
vestments, policy makers should utilize the existing structure in the following way: 
At present, all CHPs sell heat (40% of heat consumption) at the wholesale level to 
municipal utilities that deliver it to final consumers. The remaining heat stems from 
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heat-only boiler plants operated by municipal utilities (50% of heat consumption) and 
other local sources (10%). Since even under the current allocation system the costs of 
heat generation in CHPs are lower than in the municipal boiler plants, CHPs could 
benefit from cost-oriented wholesale competition for district heating, which would fa-
vor cogeneration and hence increase energy efficiency. Eensuring a workable system 
along these lines requires: 
• A Least-cost purchase requirement to ensure that municipal utilities dispatch 
heat based on the lowest costs before they use their own heat or buy from other 
sources. This might also require investments at the municipal level to ensure that 
utilities are technically able to dispatch heat. 
• An appropriate and transparent formula for cost allocation in CHPs. Among the 
methods discussed above, the Benefit distribution method appears to be the 
most appropriate one. 
• All enterprises that legally operate in the energy sector should be allowed to con-
struct CHPs (no discrimination), also on smaller scales. 
 
Finally, to avoid potential discrimination against newly build CHPs (not operated by 
Belenergo) on the power market, a similar framework should be implemented in the 
electricity sector consisting of undiscriminating access to the power grid, least cost 
dispatch and the permission for small-scale CHP operators to sell power directly to in-
dustrial consumers through the power grid at pre-specified and equal transmission 
tariffs. Obviously, all such measures could best be implemented within a market-
oriented reform of Belarus’s energy sectors along the lines described in section 2.2 
above. 
3.2 Emissions trade 
The possibility to trade permits for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions offers a promis-
ing opportunity for Belarus to finance the installation of energy-saving technologies. 
One of the objectives of the global framework for emissions trade, the Kyoto Protocol, 
is to ensure that the envisaged reduction of global GHG emissions will be achieved at 
the lowest economic costs. Therefore, emissions permits are tradable and emissions 
reductions should first be undertaken in countries and at installations where marginal 
abatement costs are the lowest. Therefore, the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism 
lays out the rules and standards under which emissions reductions from moderniza-
tion of industrial and municipal installations in developed and transition economies, 
which have ratified the Kyoto protocol, can be certified and traded as GHG emissions 
permits.18 Obviously, such a scheme is especially rewarding for countries in transition, 
given their low levels of energy efficiency and the huge need for modernization of key 
sectors such as energy and municipal service providers.19 To give an illustrative ex-
ample, Table 3 highlights the contribution of sales of emissions certificates to the fi-
nancial indicators of a typical rehabilitation project of a regional district heating sys-
tem. Total investment costs amount to USD 8.2 m and lead to annual fuel savings in 
the amount of USD 1.6 m and annual reductions of GHG emissions in the amount of 
68 thousand t of CO2-equivalent. Selling these emission permits during the relevant 
commitment period of the Kyoto protocol from 2008-201220 will – assuming prices be-
tween EUR 5 and 10 per t of CO2e – generate additional returns between EUR 1.7 m 
and EUR 3.4 m. Financing this project over a period of 10 years yields an internal rate 
of return (IRR) between 14.5% (without sales of emission rights) and up to 20% (with 
                                      
18 Among all countries that have ratified the Kyoto protocol, the biggest demand for emission certificates is expected to 
come from EU members (who already face a emission trading scheme) and Canada. 
19 The mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol as well as the potential of emissions trade for Belarus have already been the 
topic of an earlier seminar of GET/IPM, see PP/06/03 (Belarus and the Kyoto Protocol. Opportunities and Challenges). 
20 Further emissions trading schemes beyond 2012 are currently discussed, but so far nothing concrete has been de-
cided. 
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emission certificates sold at EUR 10 per t of CO2e). Accordingly, if the discount rate of 
capital is above 15%, which is not uncommon in transition economies, the project 
yields a positive Net Present Value (NPV) only if revenues form sales of emission cer-
tificates are included. 
 
Table 3. Rehabilitation of a Regional District Heating System: Project 
Characteristics and Key Figures 
Inhabitants of Region (in million) 1.3 
Number of boiler houses 175 
Length of distribution network (in km) 380 
  
Project start 2007 
Project lifetime (in years) 10 
  
Total investment (in thousand EUR) 8,200 
     thereof investments in boiler plants 2,200 
     thereof investments in distribution network 6,000 
JI-Project development costs (in thousand EUR) 300 
Annual energy savings (net, in thousand EUR) 1,600 
     thereof fuel savings in boiler plants 800 
     thereof fuel savings in distribution networks 800 
 
Emission reductions and revenue from emissions trade: 
in 1,000 EUR (at different prices)  in t of CO2e 
5 EUR/t 7 EUR/t 10 EUR/t 
per year 68,000 340 476 680 
total (2008-2012) 340,000 1,700 2,380 3,400 
 
Financial indicators (IRR and NPV) 
Price (EUR/t)    -----  
5 7 10 
IRR 14.5% 16.9% 18.2% 20.0% 
NPV (in 1,000 EUR) at:   
10.0% 1,483 2,330 2,756 3,395 
15.0% -148 525 869 1,386 
17.5% -749 -147 164 632 
20.0% -1,243 -704 -421 2 
Source: averages over several project descriptions taken from the ERUPT Program of the Netherlands. 
 
What can be done to ensure that this mechanism will also benefit Belarusian projects 
in the way outlined in table 3? It is important to understand that Belarus will have to 
compete with other transition economies for potential buyers of emission certificates. 
Two aspects deserve special attention. First, JI emission credits are certificates for 
emissions reductions that a specific project will deliver in a future period. Obviously, 
this is a risky transaction. Hence, the more credible all aspects of the project are, in-
cluding financial planning and economic viability, the higher the price that a Belaru-
sian seller can expect to get. This again calls for institutional reforms in the energy 
sector (see 2.2) in order to improve the economic condition of energy companies. 
Second, the Kyoto protocol so far foresees only one commitment period over five 
years between 2008 and 2012. Only during this time can emissions certificates be 
sold to investors. Hence, Belarusian policy makers are well advised to proceed with all 
necessary steps as soon as possible. Otherwise, Belarus might have established well-
functioning and credible conditions for JI projects at a time where demand for such 
projects has long expired. 
3.3 Private Participation 
In accordance with the current “Belarusian State Energy Program” the need in finan-
cial resources to implement energy saving activities is determined as USD 2600 mil-
lion for 2006-2010 years. The bulk of these resources should come from own means 
of enterprises (38%), Innovation Fund of the republican state governing bodies 
(24.3%), republican and local budgets (19.5%), Innovation Fund of the Ministry of 
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Energy (11.3%). Yet, the preliminary results of financing energy serving activities in 
2004 revealed the problems with raising the resources especially from enterprises and 
local budgets that managed to finance only 49% and 31.4% of targeted amounts re-
spectively. This evidence put some doubts with regard to possibility to meet the re-
quired volumes of financing for 2006-2010 years. The other potential sources of funds 
such as bank credits and resources of international financial institutions unlikely will 
be sufficient to cover the substantial investment needs. Thus, in 2004 the investment 
from these two sources was 21% and 4% of planned activities respectively. All this 
presuppose the need to look beyond traditional funding alternatives and attract pri-
vate sector in delivery and financing of energy services. 
Last decades was characterized by rush towards private participation in the provision 
of infrastructure, including energy services. The most obvious motives for private sec-
tor participation (PSP) are as follows: 
- it enables to rise funds from privatisation. Over the period 1992-2003 all transition 
countries obtained about USD 40 billions as the result of infrastructure privatisa-
tion of which USD 6.2 billions came from privatisation in CIS21; 
- the introduction of the private sector leads to improvements in efficiency, operat-
ing performance and, very often, the quality of service. The evidence suggests 
that efficiency improvements brought about by private provision reduces costs in 
order of 10 -30%22. Even in very difficult environments, e.g. energy sector in 
Georgia, private sector can substantially improve efficiency and quality of services.  
PSP implies any private sector involvement ranging from ownership to management 
contract and take wide range of contractual forms. Nevertheless they can be com-
bined into three main types: 
Divestiture presupposes that all assets, operations and investment obligations are 
transferred to the private operator. This contractual arrangement is widely used in 
electricity generation and transmission, as well as electricity and gas distribution. Most 
commonly it requires the provision of the government guarantees for future tariff in-
creases to achieve full costs recovery or return on capital invested. 
Concessions and build-operate transfer (BOT) contract implies the investment obliga-
tions in new capacity (equipment) or the replacement of the existing infrastructure. 
Under this form the level of tariff is not so crucial, as it can be compensated by lower 
lease payments for the assets, but however revenues should be sufficient to cover the 
long-term costs of services. This type of arrangement is used in electricity generation.  
Management and outsourcing contracts is the simplest form of PSP that does not in-
clude any investment obligations. This type of contract is important when it is difficult 
or even impossible to attract private investment as services have a tradition of pricing 
below costs, and government in its turn is reluctant to set a cost-covering tariff (dis-
trict heating), or the companies is too small to rise an interest of investors. Manage-
ment and outsourcing contracts can improve labor productivity, increase operating 
performance and standards of services, but they have some drawbacks compared to 
deeper forms of private participation. As a rule they are short term, and might not 
lock in improvements in efficiency and productivity 
One of the mechanisms of attracting private sector investments is involving energy 
service companies (ESCOs) to implement energy efficiency projects in industry, public 
and commercial buildings and the housing sector. ESCO provides the bulk of the fi-
nancing needed to implement a project, either by borrowing from a financial institu-
tion or investing its own money, consequently  
                                      
21 EBRD. Transition Report 2004. 
22 Clive Harris (2003). Private participation in infrastructure in developing countries. Trends, Impacts and Policy Les-
sons. World Bank Working paper No 5. 
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Another instrument to involve private participation in projects that seek to raise en-
ergy efficiency is the use of energy service companies (ESCOs). An ESCO is a separate 
company that provides integrated solutions for achieving energy cost reductions so 
that the client – e.g. the municipality as owner of a boiler plant – can deal with a sin-
gle entity for all project components and throughout all stages of the project cycle. 
ESCOs can be owned privately (for example, Siemens owns the Landis & Staefa ES-
COs in the Czech Republic) or publicly (for example, the State Committee on Energy 
Conservation owns UkrEsco in Ukraine). An ESCO’s responsibilities can, but do not 
necessarily have to, include also financing. Moreover, the ESCO’s responsibilities can 
include services like:23 
• Energy analysis and auditing. 
• Project design and development. 
• Engineering and installation. 
• Facilitation or provision of financing. 
• Management and operation. 
• Monitoring of energy savings. 
• Performance guarantees. 
 
Obviously, a company that specializes on providing such services – or at least some of 
them – for a wide range of projects and that operates in a competitive environment 
without subsidies or state guarantees needs to develop a deep expertise in energy 
service operations in order to be profitable. In fact, since ESCO’s need to increase en-
ergy efficiency in their projects to generate their profits, they are an interesting in-
strument of how to set incentives for increasing energy efficiency in a market envi-
ronment without that utilities and technical installations need to be privatized. 
It should be noted, however, that private participation does not automatically bring 
about improvement of the energy sector performance. Rather, it requires that mar-
kets have achieved a certain level of development towards competition and free mar-
ket operations so that – at least to some degree – profitable operations are possible 
and private participants can be attracted. Table 4 presents perceptions for the pros-
pects of different financial sources for financing investment into district heating, de-
pending on maturity of the market for several countries. Obviously, the market envi-
ronment in Russia and Ukraine is still perceived to be at the earliest stages of devel-
opment. A similar conclusion can be drawn for Belarus. Accordingly, for attracting pri-
vate funds, management expertise and other types of private participation the gov-
ernment needs to start with market-oriented reforms in the energy sector, as de-
scribed in section 2.2. 
Table 4. Possibility Rating* for the use of different Financing Sources 
 Hungary Czech Rep. Poland Russia Ukraine Romania Bulgaria 
Local banks 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 
Foreign banks 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 
ESCOs 4 3 2.5 1 1 2.5 2.5 
PSP 3 4 4 2 2 2.5 2 
National funds 3 3 3 1.5 1.5 2 2 
* 4 = relatively mature market, 1 = little or no possibility to use the financing sources. 
Source: Alliance to Save Energy. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Belarusian policy makers rightly focus their attention on the economy’s low level of 
energy efficiency. However, all undertaken actions – in particular the significant in-
creases of energy tariffs in recent years – have not been sufficient so far. In particular 
household tariffs are still below their costs and thus, fail to give incentives to save en-
                                      
23 OECD (2004). Coming in From the Cold. Improving District Heating Policy in Transition Economies 
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ergy. Even worse, low profitability of operations in the energy sector caused by too 
low tariffs has also caused low levels of operational efficiency in the energy sector as a 
whole. Overcoming this situation and achieving higher levels of energy efficiency re-
quires a comprehensive reform along the lines of corporatization, regulation, tariff re-
form and liberalization. This has so far not happened in Belarus, and it is also not 
foreseen in the “Belarusian State Energy Program”. 
In our discussion of specific key areas for increasing energy efficiency we find that 
their high potential can always best be used if supported by such market-oriented re-
forms. For example, Belarusian policy makers focus on district heating and cogenera-
tion to increase the level of energy efficiency. But, given low generation costs, the po-
tential of cogeneration could best be utilized through introducing wholesale competi-
tion. Similarly, other instruments such as Emissions Trade or Private Sector Participa-
tion for planning, implementing and operating energy-saving projects all require as 
precondition that the economic viability of such projects can be ensured. Again, this 
can best be realized through market-oriented reforms of the energy sector. 
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